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Economic Policies for the 1980's
by Mordechai E. Kreinin*
I INTRODUCTION
Most international economic problems are deeply rooted in domestic
economic conditions. Directly or indirectly, the internal climate exerts
pressures on international economic relations, and affects the activities of
institutions concerned with international trade and finance, such as the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Because the domestic inflation and unemploy-
ment rates in most industrial countries have increased in recent years, the
strains in the international economic system have intensified as well. This
explains the preoccupation of the IMF with the domestic problems of
member countries, for these tend to spill over into the international
arena. In the September 1979 annual meeting of the IMF Board of
Governors,
[d]iscussion of the policies and role of the Fund was in the context
of the widespread concern among Governors regarding the world eco-
nomic outlook, in light of the forecasts of continued higher inflation, a
slowing of growth in industrial countries, and severe payments problems
among the developing countries that import oil.1
Dr. Arthur Burns, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board,
stated at the same meeting: "The current instability in international
finance is largely a consequence of the chronic inflation of our times and
...stability will not return to the international monetary system until
reasonably good control over inflationary forces has been achieved. ' '2
By the same token, GATT usually begins its annual report on inter-
national trade with a survey of developments on the inflation, employ-
ment, and growth fronts.3 Indeed it is impossible to appreciate the intri-
cacies of international economic relations without comprehension of the
domestic problems confronting the major trading nations. The increased
concern over these problems deserves an explanation.
* Professor of Economics, Michigan State University. M.A. in Economics (1952) Uni-
versity of Michigan; Ph.D. in Economics (1955) University of Michigan.
' INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 8 IMF SURVEY (Oct. 29, 1979) (available by subscrip-
tion, The Secretary: Attention Publications Section, International Monetary Fund, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20431).
Id. at 334.
3 See, e.g., GENERAL AGREMErNT ON TARIFrs AND TRADE, [1978-79] ANNuAL REPORT ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, GATT/1979-4 (Geneva, Switzerland).
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Accordingly, this paper is devoted to issues of macroeconomic stabili-
zation, highlighting the twin problems of unemployment and inflation.
While the policy objective is to attain both full employment and price
stability, these two targets are not jointly attainable. Price stability can
be achieved, but only at the expense of high unemployment. Indeed, this
is the reason why inflation has not been wrung out of the economy. Con-
versely, full employment can be achieved, but only at the cost of a rapid
rise in prices. Consequently, unemployment has not been eliminated.
The trade-off between inflation and unemployment induces periodic
policy switches. Thus in 1976, immediately after his election, President
Carter declared unemployment to be "public enemy number one," and
geared the government apparatus to promote increased output and there-
fore increased employment. Unemployment declined from 8.5 percent of
the labor force in 1975 to 5.8 percent in 1979." However, the price paid for
this economic expansion was an increase in the annual rate of inflation
from 5.6 percent in 1975-76 to 11.3 percent in 1979,5 a level considered
unacceptable in the United States. As a result, the President moved to
declare inflation the "public enemy number one." And the government
policy apparatus switched gears to fight inflation, with the full expecta-
tion that unemployment would rise in the process. Practically all the
"policy-induced" economic fluctuations in industrial countries are derived
from such changes in objectives.
This articles explores the nature, meaning, and social cost of cyclical
fluctuations in the level of economic activity, and shows why the trade-off
between unemployment and inflation became less favorable in the 1970's
and the 1980's. It then explores the international economic implications
of these developments, showing that they place new and added strains on
the international economic system.
II SoME LONG-RUN TRENDS
While cyclical economic fluctuations are the main focus of this arti-
cle, it is important to realize that cyclical fluctuations are superimposed
upon certain troublesome long-run phenomena that may plague the
global economy in the next decade and beyond. Two such worldwide phe-
nomena are energy and the environment. Although public attention was
not drawn to the possible depletion of conventional forms of energy until
the 1973-74 crisis, energy experts had been forecasting the tightening of
' See the tabulation in ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, TRANSMITTED TO CON-
GRESS JANUARY, 1980, at 237 (available by purchase as stock no. 040-000-00407-6, Superin-
tendent of Documents, U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402) [hereinafter
cited as 1980 ECONoMic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT].
5Id. at 259.
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supplies for a long time. Considering the worldwide demand and supply
relationships, the price of crude petroleum is likely to double again within
a few years.6 Apart from the severe damage inflicted upon the oil-import-
ing Less Developed Countries (LDC's) by the huge increases in their oil
import bills, and the pressures exerted on the international currency sys-
tem, the "energy crisis" has two major effects on the industrial countries:
inflation and stationary or declining real personal disposable income.
As oil prices continue to rise, users will be induced to economize on
petroleum products. For instance, the substitution of labor for energy is
already taking place in manufacturing while gasoline consumption is de-
clining. Energy produceis will be motivated to develop new energy re-
sources, including substitutes to oil and natural gas. The final solution to
the problem is likely to lie in diversification of energy sources, including
coal, solar, wind, nuclear, oil shale, and tar sand, to name a few. But
switching the economy to an alternative energy base may take one or two
generations. The process can be motivated only by a substantial increase
in the price of conventional fuels. Price controls on energy merely inhibit
the conversion, and invite a severe crisis a decade or so later when the
energy resources approach depletion. Instead of keeping prices artificially
low and thereby promoting imports, the United States should allow prices
to become artificially high by decontrol and by a subsequent imposition
of taxes on the decontrolled prices. The choice facing this country is not
between low and high prices of energy. Rather, the choice is one of two
avenues: (a) increased dependence on Organization of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC) sources, with the annual cost of imported oil reach-
ing perhaps $100 million in a few years, followed by a severe crisis when
these sources are depleted; and (b) stimulating the transition to alternate
fuels and encouraging conservation by raising energy prices and inducing
large scale investments in energy development. The adjustment process
must not be truncated to a few short years. In either case, considerable
domestic resources will be devoted to energy. Domestic goods and services
will either be paid to foreigners or to ourselves. The first avenue involving
oil importation requires an ever-increasing amount of productive re-
sources to pay for oil through the export of goods and services. Under the
second avenue which requires transition to alternate fuels, vast amounts
of domestic resources will be invested in energy production. Since in each
case the magnitude of resource use is similar and unavoidable, and since
the transition approach both avoids a future crisis and diminishes our
dependence on the often unreliable foreign resources, it is the preferred
route.
Massive investments in energy, coupled with the large investments
C There remains the possibility of temporary mini-gluts occasioned, for example, by a
decline in demand during a worldwide recession.
1980
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
required for environmental clean-up,' are inflationary. Both investments
require vast expenditures to produce what had been previously available
at very low cost. To make an effective transition to alternate energy
sources, the entire economy would have to be transformed to an alterna-
tive energy base, and much of the capital stock may have to be replaced
or adapted to new higher-priced energy. New goods and services would
not become available as a result of these investments, and the same
amount of goods would cost considerably more. That would place a new
and higher floor on the rate of inflation. Whereas in the 1950's and 1960's
the annual rate of inflation fluctuated between 1 and 6 percent, the future
rate may fluctuate between 6 and 18 percent.8
A second impact of these expenditures is on real personal disposable
income and therefore on our standard of living. In past decades, the per-
centage increase in real per capita Gross National Product (GNP) was
roughly equivalent to the rise in the standard of living. Americans have
come to expect a 3 to 5 percent annual improvement in their living stan-
dards. This has not been the case in the 1970's, nor will it be in the fu-
ture. While the aforementioned investments in energy and the environ-
ment are counted as part of GNP, they do not contribute to the standard
of living as commonly perceived. A wedge is driven between the rise in
real GNP and an increase in the standard of living. Some illustrative
figures can be offered to clarify the point. If a $2.3 trillion economy grows
at an annual rate of 3 percent in real terms, output rises by nearly $70
billion. But with energy-environmental investments in the $60 to $80 bil-
lion range, nothing is left to increase personal income. It remains station-
ary. The only way to raise real personal income is by substantially in-
creasing the growth rate of real GNP. However, for various reasons such
an increase in unlikely. Indeed, the rise in energy prices induces substitu-
tion of labor for capital, and is therefore one of the factors responsible for
impeding the growth of labor productivity.9 Families protect themselves
against declining real incomes by increasing the number of family mem-
bers in the labor force.
A stationary standard of living creates social stress, which is exacer-
bated by the need to redistribute income in favor of the poor - a redis-
tribution that normally takes place through the government budget. It is
easier to redistribute out of a growing "pie" than out of a stationary or
even a shrinking "pie." This may explain the recent rash of legislative
initiatives favoring the upper middle class.
Because unions and other powerful groups refuse to accept the inevi-
table reduction in living standard, they compete with each other for a
I Environmental clean-up investments pay for past, present, and future "sins" in pol-
luting air and water.
S See, 1980 ECONoMic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 4, at 259.
' Substitution of labor for capital increases labor input, and reduces the output per
worker.
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greater share of total income or output." The outcome cannot be any-
thing but inflationary. This component of inflationary pressure is not
likely to abate. Consequently, the developments outlined here are mani-
fested in inflation.1 ' These conditions in turn exacerbate the cyclical fluc-
tuations in unemployment and inflation, to which we turn next.
III. INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT
A. Definition.
Inflation is defined as a process of rising price level.' 2 The emphasis
is on rising, not high, prices. Once prices- stabilize, at whatever level, infla-
tion is said to have stopped. Also, a rise of prices in one sector of the
economy does not constitute inflation if it is offset by price declines in
other sectors. Rather, the weighted average of all prices must be rising.
Such a weighted average, calculated relative to a base year, is known as a
price index. The most widely used index is the Consumer Price Index
(C.P.I.). It represents a weighted average change in the retail prices of all
goods and services purchased by final consumers, where the weight of
each good represents its importance in the consumer basket. That index
rose at an annual rate of 11.3 percent in 1979.13
Unemployment refers to the proportion of the labor force that is in-
voluntarily out of work. Unlike inflation, it describes a stationary propor-
tion of the labor force. Since employment varies positively with the level
of real output in the economy (real GNP), unemployment varies inversely
with aggregate output. But zero unemployment is not the objective of ec-
onomic policy. In a dynamic economy a certain amount of unemployment
is unavoidable. At any given point in time, a portion of ihe labor force is
in transition: switching jobs and changing locations, for example. Known
as frictional unemployment, the transitional process involves 1 to 2 per-
cent of the labor force." Another 3 to 4 percent of all workers are struc-
10 Output always equals income in the economy.
1, There exists a popular belief that the ratio of energy supply to real GNP is somehow
constant. Thus a 20 percent reduction in energy supply would lower aggregate output in the
same proportion and produce a major depression. However, neither economic theory nor
empirical observations support this view. As the price of energy rises relative to that of
other inputs, there is a substitution of labor for energy, and of energy efficient machines for
inefficient ones. The energy to GNP ratio declines, and real GNP need not plunge in any-
thing near the same proportion.
12 For a more detailed explanation of the meaning of inflation, see Kreinin, Inflation,
Recession, and Staglation, [Winter] MICH. ST. U. Bus. Topics 5 (1978).
13 See 1980 ECONoMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 4, at 259.
14 For discussion see Kreinin, What Have We Learned or Not Learned About Eco-
nomic Stabilization Policies?, [Winter] MICH. ST. U. Bus. Topics 48-49 (1978).
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turally unemployed, in the sense that they do not possess the necessary
skills for an increasingly sophisticated economy. Because frictional and
structural unemployment total around 5 percent of the labor force, full
employment is said to exist when about 95 percent of the labor force is
employed. By the same token, some manufacturing plans and equipment
are expected to be idle at any given time for a variety of reasons. Conse-
quently, capacity is said to be fully utilized when plant utilization
throughout the economy averages somewhat less than 90 percent.
At times of excessively high aggregate demand such as during a war,
unemployment may fall below the 5 percent mark and capacity utilization
may rise above 90 percent. This is a condition of over full employment,
and usually involves high inflation.
B. Social Cost.
The economic cost of unemployment is easy to conceptualize and to
measure. It is the output of goods and services foregone by society. If
potential real output - namely output produced at full employment -
were $2.4 trillion, while actual aggregate output is only $2.3 trillion due to
unemployment of workers and machines, then lost output amounts to
$100 billion. To that cost one might add the emotional, psychological, and
sociological burdens often associated with unemployment such as the pos-
sibility of increased crime.
By contrast, the economic cost of inflation is more difficult to pin
down, despite the strong aversion to inflation on the part of most people.
That aversion is rooted in the widespread belief that price increases un-
dermine the real value of earnings and therefore the standard of living.
But that notion is largely a myth. Real income is reflected in the relation
between the rate of increase in money earnings and the rate of inflation.
A 14 percent rise in money income accompanied by 13 percent inflation
yields a 1 percent increase in real income. A stationary real income can
result from zero inflation and zero rise in money earnings, or from any
percentage increase in earnings matched by an equal rate of inflation.
Real income in the economy is determined only by output of goods and
services, which in turn depends on the productivity of factors such as la-
bor. The rate of inflation by itself does not directly affect real income. If
the energy-environment situation dictates a stationary real personal in-
come, society collectively decides on the rate of increase in money income,
and a matching rate of inflation will follow. Since a rise in money income
makes us "feel better," through a variety of social mechanisms we collec-
tively opt for the inflationary route rather than for a zero rise in earnings.
Inflation is a symptom; it does not in and of itself directly undermine real
income as commonly perceived.
What then are the costs of inflation? Its most pervasive cost is in-
come redistribution among various groups in society - redistribution
which can be capricious and arbitrary. Debtors gain and creditors lose as
Vol. 12:425
ECONOMIC POLICIES-THE 1980s
debts are repaid in dollars that are worth less in real terms, namely in
terms of purchasing power. People such as retirees who live on fixed
money income lose. Small savers lose as long as there exist statutory limi-
tations on interest rates paid on passbook savings accounts. At 11 percent
annual inflation, a 5.5 percent interest rate means a 5.5 percent15 negative
interest earning when viewed in terms of real purchasing power. While
wealthy individuals have access to sophisticated financial instruments,
such as certificates of deposit, not subject to official interest rate ceilings,
small depositors must rely on passbook savings accounts which yield in-
terest rates at a level far below the rate of inflation. They have no effec-
tive way to protect the real value of their savings. In turn businessmen
who maintain stocks of inventories may gain as the value of their invento-
ries rises.
Finally, the government gains at the expense of the private sector
because the bite taken by taxes increases: the rise in money income which
accompanies inflation pushes people into higher marginal tax brackets,
even though their real income is unchanged.16 Thus real after-tax income
declines. This is illustrated by the following example: In 1964 the median
income of a family of four was $8,132.17 In 1979 it was $18,815.18 This is a
gain of 131 percent over a 15 year period, slightly less than the rise in
prices. Despite the tax cuts of 1964 and 1965, the marginal tax rate to
which this average family is subject rose from 18 to 21 percent.19 Its real
after-tax income declined by $1,056 over this period. 20 If the inflation is
anticipated, it can be guarded against by linking contracts to the cost of
living. Unanticipated inflation is more difficult to deal with.
These effects can be compounded because the rate of inflation is un-
likely to remain at a standstill. Inflation tends to feed upon itself, as peo-
ple expect it to continue and perhaps accelerate, and consequently begin
to build it into their economic calculations and wage demands. The rate
of inflation tends to rise if left unchecked. And high inflation may have a
negative effect on the saving behavior of individuals, thereby curtailing
the growth rate in the economy. Why save if the real value of accumu-
lated savings is eroded away by inflation? At some point inflation may
accelerate to a "galloping" pace, as experienced in the past by some Latin
1'5 The 5.5 percent figure is 11 percent less 5.5 percent.
'e Canada guards against this eventuality by linking the income tax to the cost of living
index. This is done every year by pushing up the income brackets to which tax rates apply
by a proportion equal to the rise in the cost of living index. Malabre, As Salaries Climb
With Prices, People Pay More of Income in Taxes Despite Rate Cuts, Wall St. J., Nov. 28,
1979, at 40, col. 2.
17 Id., col. 1.
'8 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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American countries and today by Israel. At that rate people lose confi-
dence in money as a medium of exchange. To the extent that segments of
society are then forced to resort to barter transactions, efficiency of pro-
duction and therefore real income would suffer.
IV CAUSES OF INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT
A. Market for a Single Product.
It is useful to diagnose the problems of inflation and unemployment
within an analytical framework similar to the traditional supply and de-
mand analysis. The market for an individual product is described in a
two-dimensional space, where the quantity bought or sold is shown on the
horizontal axis, while the price is depicted on the vertical axis. The de-
mand curve, or schedule, is downward sloping, showing that the lower the
price the greater the quantity purchased.21 A price reduction induces con-
sumers to switch from substitute products to the product in question,
thereby increasing the quantity demanded. The supply curve, or sched-
ule, is upward sloping showing that the higher the price the greater the
quantity supplied.22 The intersection of the two curves yields equilibrium
market price and quantity exchanged.2 3 Total revenue of the sellers,
which equals the total expenditures by the buyers, amounts to price mul-
tiplied by quantity. It is shown geometrically by the rectangle under equi-
librium point e. A shift in either the demand or the supply curve will
generate a change in the price and quantity in a known direction.
Chart 1: Market for an Individual Product
P P Supply S
1 mand P Pe
Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2  Qe
(a) Demand (b) Supply (c) Demand and Supply
A variant of the analysis can be applied to the aggregate economy. In this
case the vertical axis represents a weighted average of all prices in the
economy, or the price index, instead of the price of an individual com-
21 Note the direction of the arrows in Chart 1 (a) infra.
22 The supply curve is depicted in Chart 1 (b) infra.
23 Equilibrium price and quantity are indicated by Pe and Q. respectively in Chart 1 (c)
infra.
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modity. The horizontal axis measures the quantity of all goods and ser-
vices produced in the economy or real GNP.
24
B. Aggregate Demand.
The demand curve D in Chart 2, is now aggregate demand. It de-
scribes the relationship between the quantity of all final goods and ser-
vices demanded in the economy, and the average price level of these
goods and services. Its slope shows that as the average price level de-
clines, the quantity of all goods and services demanded increases. To see
the reason for this relation, assume that the price level of all goods and
services declines from P 1 to P2 as indicated by the arrow along the verti-
cal axis in Chart 2. The decline in price makes people feel wealthier, be-
cause the real value of their financial assets rises. As a consequence they
spend more on all goods and services, as indicated by the arrow along the
horizontal axis, and the quantity purchased rises from Q, to Q2.
Price Index
P
- Aggregate
P1 Demand = C + I + G +X
P2
D
_3P Real bNP ($billions)
0 Q1 Q2
Chart 2: Aggregate Demand
There are four main components of aggregate demand. First, consumer
expenditures on non-durable goods, durable goods, and services consti-
tute about two-thirds of the total aggregate demand in the United
States.2 5 Consumer expenditures are labeled C in Chart 2. Second, private
domestic investments are labeled I, and include business expenditures on
plants and equipment, residential construction, and changes in invento-
24 Nominal or money GNP is the total money value of all goods and services produced
in a given year. Real GNP is that value divided, or "deflated," by an appropriate price
index.
25 See the tabulation in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 66 FED.
REs. BULL., at A-52 (Feb. 1980). The numerical valuation of each component may be ob-
tained from this table.
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ries. The third component is government expenditures on goods and ser-
vices. Labelled G on Chart 2, government expenditures include expendi-
tures by the federal government, as well as state and local governments.
Finally, net exports 6 of goods and services is a relatively small item, la-
belled X n. Thus, aggregate demand = C + I + G + Xn.
C. Aggregate Supply.
Shown on the same two dimensional space, aggregate supply de-
scribes the relation between the supply of all goods and services and the
price index of these goods and services. The dashed vertical lines in Chart
3 divide the space into three regions. At low levels of output, indicated as
Region I, the economy is functioning well below full capacity. There is
considerable unemployment in the labor force, and unused or "excess"
capacity in manufacturing plants. Starting from output level (a) which
may represent $1.5 trillion in real GNP,.the supply of output can expand
without an increase in prices, for a simple, logical reason: with so much
slack or unused resources in the economy, firms can expand production
by hiring workers and machines at a constant price. They need not offer
higher wages to attract workers from competing firms because much un-
employment exists among workers of practically all skills and occupa-
tions. They can hire workers from the pool of the unemployed.
Price level
I Aggregate
Supply
Region Region
III Region III
I I
(a)
Real GNP
($ billions)(a)
Full
Employment
Output
Chart 3: Aggregate Supply
Moving in the direction of the arrow, as output rises to the area labelled
Region II, unemployment of workers and machines declines. In this re-
26 Net exports are exports minus imports of goods and services.
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gion, expansion of aggregate output can come about only if accompanied
by an increase in the general price level. This occurs for several reasons.
First, bottlenecks27 begin to appear in certain industries, even when aver-
age output for the economy as a whole is below full capacity. Certain
plants and perhaps industries already function at near full capacity, and
certain labor skills are in short supply. Also certain labor unions experi-
ence high employment among their members, and may become more mili-
tant in wage demands. Specific firms with market power approach full
capacity operations, and consequently begin to push up prices. A general
increase in aggregate output in this region requires firms to bid away
workers from other firms by offering higher wages, and these are passed
on to consumers in the form of higher prices. Certain raw materials may
also be in short supply, commanding higher prices. Consequently the ag-
gregate supply curve slopes upward at first gently, but as output rises and
unemployment declines, the slope becomes steeper. Bottlenecks and
shortages become more widespread, and unions as well as firms find it
easier to exercise market power and push up wages and prices. In Region
II expansion of output can be induced only if the price level rises.
As full employment output is approached at perhaps 6 percent un-
employment, which denotes the beginning of Region III, the aggregate
supply curve becomes very steep. In the vicinity of full employment, ex-
pansion of output can be achieved only at the cost of a rapid rise in the
price level. Beyond the full employment level of output,28 further eco-
nomic expansion is possible only on a small scale, and only at the cost of
high inflation.
During the last two decades the economy functioned mainly in Re-
gion II. Consequently subsequent graphs highlight that region. The eco-
nomic expansion of 1975-79 pushed the economy towards the upper
reaches of that region, with unemployment declining to 5.7 percent, that
is, rather close to the full employment level.2 9 Prices rose precipitously.3 0
In 1980, the economy appears to be receding from that level, and moving
into a recession.
D. Aggregate Demand and Supply Combined.
Chart 4 combines the aggregate demand (AD) and aggregate supply
(AS) schedules in the same two dimensional space. Their intersection at
point e yields the equilibrium real GNP, QE on the horizontal axis, and
the equilibrium price level, PE on the vertical axis. The cause of unem-
ployment is immediately apparent. It would be a sheer and unlikely coin-
cidence for the AD and AS curves to intersect at a point which corre-
27 "Bottleneck" describes a situation where no unused capacity exists in firms in one
stage of a multi-stage production process of a certain product.
2s The full employment level of output is defined in section (C)(1) supra.
29 This level was reached in February, March, June, and July of 1979. See 1980 Eco-
NoMic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 4, at 237.
20 See id. at 259.
1980
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
sponds to full employment output. The distance along the horizontal
axis between equilibrium output (QE) and the unique full employment
output is the GNP gap. Its size determines the level of unemployment in
the economy.
An upward shift in aggregate demand from AD to AD', moves the
equilibrium position from e to e'. Output expands to Q'E, toward the full
employment level moving to the right along the horizontal axis, but prices
also rise to PE moving upward along the vertical axis. While it lasts, this
process of rising prices is inflation. As AD moves further to the right, the
rise in the price level becomes more precipitous, meaning a higher rate of
inflation.8 ' Because this inflation is caused by successive increases in ag-
gregate demand it is known as demand inflation. Demand inflation be-
comes high only in the vicinity of full employment. This explains why
inflation tends to increase during the peak of a business cycle, and sub-
side during the trough.
Price Level
P 
AD'
AD
P- -
el
P
Region II
Real
0GNP
QE Q ''Full ($ billions)
E employment
Chart 4: Aggregate Demand and Supply
Such shifts in aggregate demand, in either direction, can occur in the
private sector, as consumers (C), investors (I) or foreigners (X n) change
the level of their spending. Expansion of output can be attained only at
the cost of a rising price level: inflation. Conversely, a reduction in the
rate of inflation can be attained by shifting aggregate demand downward.
The AD shifts to the left, but does so at the cost of shrinking real output
3, On a more technical level, the chart can be reinterpreted by showing inflation, or the
rate of price change, on the vertical axis. Thus a rightward shift in AD stimulates inflation.
A leftward shift in AD lowers the rate of inflation; it does not actually reduce prices.
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and hence unemployment. This underscores the trade-off between infla-
tion and unemployment.
Shifts in aggregate demand can also be brought about by government
measures, known as demand management policies. These are the policies
traditionally employed by the government to stabilize the economy. But
because they operate within Region II of the aggregate supply curve, they
are also subject to the trade-off between inflation and unemployment.
The main reason for not reaching and maintaining full employment is its
cost in terms of inflation. Conversely, the main reason for not attaining
price stability is its cost in terms of unemployment.
IV DEMAND MANAGEMENT POLICIES
Two types of policy are available to the government to influence ag-
gregate demand: fiscal policy and monetary policy. Fiscal policy relies on
changes in government expenditures hereinafter labelled G, or taxes here-
inafter labelled T, or both. Monetary policy relies on changes in the
money supply.
A. Fiscal Policy.
Suppose the government wishes to increase output and employment
albeit at the cost of rising prices. First, it can increase government ex-
penditures while holding taxes constant. G is one of the four channels of
expenditures, but the level of G is subject to the discretion of policy mak-
ers. A rise in G has the same effect as an increase in private expenditures;
it pushes the AD schedule to the right. In the process, an increase in G
moves the federal budget toward a deficit, and increases the share of gov-
ernment spending in the economy.
Second, the government can lower taxes. Although such a step has no
direct impact on the economy, it leaves more purchasing power in the
hands of the private sector. If the cut occurs in the personal income tax,
consumers have more money to spend; consumption rises, and the AD
schedule is shifted to the right. If the cut occurs in profit taxes, business
firms have more money to invest; investments rise, and the AD schedule
similarly moves to the right. In both cases, the economy expands. As in
the case of increasing G, the lowering of taxes pushes the federal budget
toward a deficit. But when taxes are lowered, the share of government
spending in the economy declines. More importantly, the two fiscal poli-
cies are not mutually exclusive. The government can increase G and lower
T at the same time.
Many problems are associated with altering the rates of taxation and
governmental expenditures, not the least of which is knowing the correct
dose that needs to be applied, and the proper mix if both G and T are
altered. Additionally, there is a six to nine month lags 2 between the time
32 We ignore the more technical details arising from differential lags in the response of
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the policy button is pressed, and the time when its effect on the economy
is fully felt. Thus, ideally fiscal policy should aim at conditions prevailing
six months after the policy is promulgated, but those are not known with
any degree of certainty."3
The desirable mix of changes in G and T depends on many factors.
Because G has a direct impact on aggregate spending and T only an indi-
rect impact, a change in G has a greater dollar per dollar effect on the
economy. But the time lag in planning and executing new expenditures is
also longer. It is more difficult to reverse course when economic condi-
tions change and dictate such a reversa. The choice between G and T
also depends on whether the body politic wishes to increase or reduce the
share of government spending in the economy. Finally, if the tax route is
chosen, in whole or in part, the type of taxes to be reduced must be
determined.
Nonetheless, it is clear that a move toward a budgetary deficit - by
raising G, lowering T, or both - stimulates economic activity at the cost
of raising prices. Conversely, should the government wish to combat infla-
tion, it would lower government expenditures or raise taxes, or both, and
thereby move the federal budget toward a surplus. This policy shifts the
AD curve to the left; inflation is curtailed, but only at the cost of reduced
output and higher unemployment. In 1979, the budget deficit was re-
duced to $28 billion, from $49 billion in the previous fiscal year, in an
attempt to reduce inflation."
B. Monetary Policy.
Monetary policy in the United States is in the hands of an agency
politically independent from the Administration, the Federal Reserve
System. Many consumption and investment expenditures in the economy
depend upon borrowed funds, the cost of which is the rate of interest.
These include purchases of homes and cars, or plants and equipment. If
the Federal Reserve wishes to expand economic activity, that is expand
real GNP, it can make funds readily available and reduce their cost: the
rate of interest. This stimulates consumption and investment spending,
and pushes the AD curve to the right.
Because most of our money stock is created by commercial banks in
the form of demand deposits (or checking accounts), the Federal Reserve
has three ways of increasing money supply. First, by a technique known
as "open market operations," it can pump more reserves into the banking
prices and of output. The price lag tends to be longer than the output lag. That differential
lag is the one cause of stagflation. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, ECONoMIcs 277
(1979).
33 In fact, even current conditions are not known, for it takes one or two months to
compile the statistics. This lag in statistics, as well as the policy lag underscore the impor-
tance of economic forecasting.
", See 1980 ECONoMIc REPORT OP THE PRESIDENT, supra note 4, at 285.
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system by buying government bonds in the open market, thus infusing
funds into the system and enabling banks to create more money. Second,
it can lower the legal reserve requirements of the banks, thus leaving
them free to create more money through the expansion of loans. Finally it
can directly lower the interest rate it charges banks on borrowed funds,
known as the discount rate, and thereby signal to the banks its desire to
see interest rates lowered throughout the economy. These actions stimu-
late private expenditures and shift the AD curve to the right. Though the
impact of monetary policy is also subject to a six to nine month lag, out-
put, employment, and unfortunately prices would eventually rise. The
above policies should be reversed if the objective is to dampen the rate of
inflation. A contractionary policy would make funds more scarce and
more costly, and thereby reduce private expenditures that depend on bor-
rowed funds. The AD curve shifts to the left. Inflation abates, but real
output declines and unemployment rises. These measures were intro-
duced by the Federal Reserve in October 1979 and intensified in March,
1980, with the objective of lowering the rate of inflation.3 5 In the process,
the employment of measures which increase the cost and scarcity of funds
caused a recession in 1980.
C. Summary.
Monetary policy does not require prior approval by the Congress. It
is therefore a more flexible tool than fiscal policy, and can be employed
with greater dispatch. However, both types of policy operate by affecting
aggregate demand, and consequently are subject to a trade-off between
inflation and unemployment. This trade-off has been averted only when
the economy operated in Region I of the AS curve. Attempts to alleviate
the trade-off problem by imposing price and wage controls, while at the
same time stimulating the economy, have generally backfired. While in
force, the controls tend to distort the pattern of economic activity and
promote inefficiency. Although prices and wages are held in check during
the control period, a delayed reaction occurs when they are lifted. Prices
tend to rise sharply, compensating for the months of control.
VI LEFTWARD SHIFT IN AGGREGATE SUPPLY - STAGFLATION
Most observers recognize that the inflation-unemployment problem
became more serious in the 1970's. Indeed, from 1972 to 1975 both unem-
ployment and inflation increased in the United States.3 6 The existence of
35 See the announcement by the Federal Reserve on Oct. 6, 1979 in Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, 65 FED. RES. BULL. 830 (Oct. 1979).
31 See the tabulations in 1980 ECONOMic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 4 at 237,
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inflation and unemployment at the same time is known as stagflation3 7
How can it be explained.?
In the previous analysis the aggregate demand schedule was shown to
shift up or down, holding the aggregate supply schedule constant. Supz
pose we reverse the process. Holding aggregate demand constant, we shift
the aggregate supply schedule to the left: In Chart 5, the AS curve is
moved from AS1 to AS2. The two leftward pointing arrows indicate that
this is a reduction in supply, because at any given price level, a smaller
quantity of goods and services is supplied. Since AD remains unchanged,
the equilibrium point of intersection shifts from e1 to e2 . Real GNP de-
clines from Q1 to Q2 while the price level rises from P1 to P2. The result is
stagflation.
Q 2 Q1 FullEmployment
Output
Real GNP
Chart 5: Leftward Shift In Aggregate Supply
Any economy-wide increase in production costs causes such a shift in
aggregate supply. Thus, the worldwide boom of 1972-73 generated a large
increase in the prices of raw materials.3 8 This increase happened to coin-
cide with the sharp rise in food prices caused by drought conditions in
certain areas of the world. The quadrupling of oil prices closely followed
the increase in food prices. Oil prices doubled again since 1975, so that
3' For a more detailed explanation of the meaning of stagflation, see Kreinin, supra
note 12.
38 Id.
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during 1974-1979 they increased eight-fold.3 9 Since energy costs affect the
production of all goods, production costs will invariably rise: Producers
will offer any given quantity of goods and services only at higher prices.
That has the same effect as offering a reduced quantity at each price, as
is demonstrated in Chart 6. The upward pointing arrows indicates that
each given volume of output will be supplied only at higher prices. As a
result, aggregate supply shifts from AS1 to AS2. But this is equivalent to
saying that less is supplied at each given price, as shown by the leftward
pointing arrow. Thus, the all-pervasive rise in energy prices has the effect
of moving aggregate supply to the left and causing stagflation.
AS 2  AS 1
P
Real GNP
Chart 6: Shift in the AS Curve
Environmental and safety regulations promulgated by the federal
government require massive new investment expenditures which similarly
move aggregate supply to the left, as does the strengthening of workplace
health and safety standards. These expenditures, coupled with a rapid
rise in wage rates and a minimal yearly increase in labor productivity
raise production costs, and cause a leftward shift in aggregate supply.
Chart 5 clearly depicts the grave effects of the leftward shift in AS.
Prices rise from P1 to P 2, and continue to rise as long as AS keeps shifting
to the left in response to rising production costs. While the process con-
tinues, this is inflation. Because it is caused by a shift in aggregate sup-
ply, which in turn is a result of rising costs, it is known as supply or cost
inflation.
Next, note what happens to output. While demand inflation is ac-
so Id.
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companied by an expansion in real GNP, cost inflation is accompanied by
a contraction in real GNP from Q, to Q2, and causes a rise in unemploy-
ment. If continued for two quarters or longer, the reduction in real GNP
is termed a recession. This combination of inflation and unemployment is
stagflation. Thus, the classic cause of stagflation is a reduction in aggre-
gate supply. Its frequent occurrence in the 1970's and beyond can be
traced to continuous increase in worldwide energy prices, the gradual
tightening of environmental standards, and the rise in labor production
costs due in part to sluggish productivity growth.
Finally, the leftward shift in AS aggravates the trade-off between in-
flation and unemployment. Thus, Chart 7 concentrates on Region II and
simplifies Chart 5 by introducing a straight line aggregate supply. Aggre-
gate supply is shown to decline from AS 1 to AS 2 and equilibrium shifts
from e1 to e2. To attain full employment on AS1, AD must be shifted
upward, so that it intersects AS 1 at point R. But on AS 2, such intersection
can occur only at point S: Attainment of full employment now requires
more inflation than before. Conversely, to lower inflation to a desired
price level, P, aggregate demand must be shifted downward. On AS1 theintersection would occur at point M. But on AS2, AD must be lowered all
the way to point N, involving a much greater loss of output and therefore
more unemployment. Thus, the cost of controlling inflation rises in terms
of unemployment.
P AD
S 
AS 2
P N
e
. I Real GNP
Employment
Output
Chart 7: The Inflation-Unemployment Trade-off
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VII RECENT HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
In the 1950's and early 1960's, the U.S. economy was in Region I of
the aggregate supply schedule, experiencing high unemployment and vir-
tually no inflation. 40 The 1964 and 1965 tax cuts shifted AD to the right
and moved the country towards full employment, without a significant
increase in prices.4 1 But in 1967 came the escalation of the Vietnam war.
President Johnson refused to increase taxes to match the $30 billion rise
in defense spending, even though the economy was already approaching
full employment. The large deficit so created, when superimposed upon a
fully employed economy, could not fail to generate the inflation of 1968-
69. Thus, the origin of the last decade of inflation was a rise in aggregate
demand. There followed attempts to deal with the inflation by demand
management policies. In the first half of the 1970's, however, a constella-
tion of circumstances combined to shift aggregate supply to the left. The
circumstances included a worldwide drought, and a rise in raw material as
well as in energy prices.42 To offset the resulting stagflation, President
Nixon attempted to stimulate the economy by demand management, and
to deal with the inflation by price-wage controls.43 But when the controls
were lifted, a catch-up increase in prices fueled the inflation. Under Presi-
dent Ford, fiscal and monetary policies were used to dampen aggregate
demand. The rate of inflation declined to the 4-5 percent range, but un-
employment rose to 8.5 percent.44 Upon assuming office, President Carter
reversed the priorities and moved to stimulate the economy. Unemploy-
ment declined gradually to 5.7 percent in 1979 but inflation rose to over
11 percent."5 In the first quarter of 1980, inflation accelerated. The econ-
omy appeared to be experiencing a leftward shift in AS coupled with a
rightward shift in AD, shown in Chart 8. In 1979-80 the direction of pol-
icy was again reversed. Contractionary monetary policy was relied upon
to dampen the inflation, but in the process it produced the 1980
recession.
10 For the exact figures, see 1980 EcoNoMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 4, at
237, 259.
41 See id.
42 See Kreinin, supra note 12 at 5, 13-14.
"3 Id. at 12-13.
44 See 1980 ECONoMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 4 at 237, 259.
45 Id. Meanwhile, Europe's sluggish post recession growth prevented it from experienc-
ing a similar reduction in unemployment. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 8 IMF SUR-
vEY 285, 286 (Sept. 17, 1979).
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VII THE POLICY CHALLENGES FOR THE 1980'S
Tight energy supplies will make conditions worse in the 1980's, as the
AS schedule shifts further to the left. What remedial actions are availa-
ble? Inspection of Chart 5 shows that the most salutory results can be
obtained from a shift of the AS schedule to the right: Inflation would
subside, and output would expand. The equilibrium point would move
from e2 to e1 and onward down the AD schedule. Measures designed to
shift aggregate supply are termed supply management policies, otherwise
known as "supply-side economics." They have seldom been used since
World War II.
What might such measures be? A reduction in social security busi-
ness payroll taxes would lower production costs and thereby shift the
AS schedule to the right. Reduction in sales and excise taxes would have
a similar effect. Beyond this, fiscal and monetary policies will have to be
targeted so as to increase productivity and to stimulate investments and
therefore subsequent output. Possible steps include a reduction in certain
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business taxes, an increase in the investments tax credit, and an increase
in the deduction allowed for accelerated depreciation.
IX INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis can also be employed to explain the augmented
concern about domestic economic conditions on the part of the IMF
board of governors. The trade-off between inflation and unemployment
affects all industrial countries. Each nation must choose from among the
possible inflation-unemployment mixes - unpalatable as those mixes
might be. However, different countries have different preferences. Ger-
many appears less tolerant of inflation, and is likely to choose a mix in-
volving a very low inflation rate even at the cost of high unemployment.
By contrast, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States may be
less tolerant of unemployment, and are likely to choose mixes involving
lower unemployment even at the cost of high inflation. In the words of
Mr. Koehler, President of Germany's Central Bank: "In the U.S. the
main memories and fears are of the unemployment caused by the Great
Depression. In Germany the fear is of the inflationary catastrophe of the
1920s. As soon as prices go up even a little we see this fear. '46
The leftward shift in aggregate supply and the consequent worsening
of the trade-off problem creates greater divergences between nations in:
(a) the rates of inflation and (b) the growth rates of real GNP. Indeed, a
recent IMF study shows a sharp increase in the absolute dispersion of
national inflation rates since the mid-1970's. 47 Certain evidence also sug-
gests a similar increase in the dispersion between the real growth rates of
different countries.
Why is this important? The relative rates of inflation and of real
growth rates are the two main determinants of a country's imports and
exports of goods and services. 48 A high rate of inflation relative to the rest
of the world erodes a country's competitive position alt home and abroad,
and tends to reduce exports and increase imports. A high growth rate in
real GNP relative to the rest of the world implies rapidly rising real in-
comes. In turn, this causes an increase in imports of both consumer and
investments goods. Common sense and empirically verified economic the-
ory suggest that imports rise with real income.
Differential interest rates between countries are one determinant of
international capital flows, as short term funds are attracted to the high
interest countries. Because an increase in interest rates is one tool used to
combat inflation, large differences in inflation rates tend to result in large
inter-country differentials in interest rates, which in turn generate inter-
" Wall St. J. (clipping on file in the office of the CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LAW).
17 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 8 IMF SuRVEY 350 (Nov. 12, 1979).
48 See M. KREININ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 80 (3d ed. 1979).
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national capital flows. The countries experiencing outflow of capital are
subject to balance of payments pressure, and a downward movement in
the exchange value of their currency.
Compare, for example, a country which regards inflation as a
nightmare (country A) with one which dreads unemployment (country B),
Country A would sacrifice growth to keep inflation under control. Conse-
quently, it would tend to have low inflation and slow growth in real GNP
relative to its competitors. Its external balance on goods and services
would be in surplus, thus exerting an upward pressure on the exchange
value of its currency. By contrast, country B would tend to accept a high
rate of inflation in order to attain faster growth relative to its trading
partners. A downward pressure on the exchange value of its currency
would result from its sustaining recurring deficits in its external balance
on goods and services. Thus, the internal choice of an inflation-unemploy-
ment mix that society considers desirable, and the attendant domestic
policies designed to attain this mix, spill over into the international econ-
omy. The worsening of the trade-off options caused by the leftward shift
in aggregate supply in the industrial countries, means that such differen-
tials and the accompanying external imbalances will grow more severe in
the future. This, in turn, implies a greater range of fluctuations of floating
exchange rates and more intense pressures on the fixed exchange rates.
These developments happen to coincide with an increasing reluctance of
most countries to accept: (a) what they regard as "excessive" fluctuations
in exchange rates, and (b) recurring external deficits on goods and ser-
vices. The two points will be considered in turn.
The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates
in March 1973, and the introduction of floating exchange rates, was not a
result of careful and deliberate action by central bankers. Rather, it was
brought about by the onslaught of market forces. 49 Only fluctuating rates
can accommodate highly divergent inflation and growth rates between
countries. In the mid-1970's, a constellation of events affecting the inter-
national economy combined to generate rather large swings in exchange
rates. Overlooking the fact that fluctuating exchange rates are supposed
to fluctuate, many central bankers grew increasingly displeased with the
system. The dissatisfaction was especially intense in Europe, where the
proximity of borders often forces people to deal in foreign currencies on a
daily basis. Such fluctuations introduce uncertainty into ordinary transac-
tions. As a result, seven European currencies" were pegged to each other
19 Id. at 187-92. See also M. Kreinin, United States Foreign Economic Policy - An
Overview, Seminar Paper No. 124 (Aug. 1979) (background paper for the March 1979 Rome
Conference, Institute for International Economic Studies, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden) at
12-13, to be reprinted in J. EcON. IssuEs (Sept. 1980) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Foreign
Economic Policy].
80 The seven currencies included those of all of the European Economic Community
countries except the United Kingdom.
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within the European Monetary System (EMS) to provide a "zone of mon-
etary stability."51 Exchange rate pressures within the EMS are likely to
grow in the future necessitating more frequent exchange rate adjust-
ments. Furthermore the range of exchange fluctuations of other curren-
cies is likely to grow as well.
Aversion to recurring trade deficits results in part from the effect of
import competition in displacing domestic production and causing unem-
ployment. Both unions and management in certain import-competing in-
dustries have been led to seek tariff, quota, and other forms of protection
in recent years. Indeed, this is one main reason for the emergence of the
so called "New Protectionism" in several industrial countries, including
the United States.52 As these pressures intensify, there is a danger that
the post war trend toward trade liberalization among the industrial coun-
tries will be reversed, to the detriment of all concerned. Despite the suc-
cess of the Tokyo round of trade negotiations, new forms of non-tariff
barriers to trade appear at every turn. These trends require increased vig-
ilance on the part of GATT in trade matters and on the part of the IMF
in financial matters.
The unsettling effects of the recurring Japanese surpluses on the for-
eign currency markets in 1977-78 suggest that it may be desirable for the
international trading community to consider the introduction of rules
that prohibit a country from running persistent surpluses or deficits on
the trade and service account, unless offset by long term capital flows.
Monitored by GATT, the rules could specify the maximum size of the
imbalance - in proportion to a country's exports or imports - and the
maximum number of consecutive years in which the imbalance would be
permitted to recur. Responsibility for rectifying the imbalance, either by
domestic measures or by exchange rate changes, must not rest only with
the deficit countries. Rather, the burden must be shared, and if anything,
it should be borne to a large extent by the countries which exhibit a sur-
plus. The methods for remedying the imbalance must be left to the coun-
tries themselves, but must not include new trade restrictions. Finally, a
need may exist for strengthening the international institutions
themselves.
53
See U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, supra note 49, at 14-17.
52 See id. at 7-10.
'3 See Kreinin, Needed-A Super Agency for Finance, Trade, and Aid, 1972 J. ECON.
ISSUES 187.

